University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive

OSSA 7

Jun 6th, 9:00 AM - Jun 9th, 5:00 PM

Between the Two Images: Reconciling the Scientific and Manifest
Images
Mark Weinstein
Montclair State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Weinstein, Mark, "Between the Two Images: Reconciling the Scientific and Manifest Images" (2007).
OSSA Conference Archive. 151.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA7/papersandcommentaries/151

This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized
conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.

Between the Two Images:
Reconciling the Scientific and Manifest Images
MARK WEINSTEIN
Educational Foundations
Montclair State University
Montclair NJ
U.S.A. 07028
weinsteinm@mail.montclair.edu

ABSTRACT: The paper bridges between a science-based metamathematical model of emerging truth and
truth emerging from inquiry within ordinary contexts of argumentation. This requires that the underlying
intuitions driving the notion of truth in the scientific image be made clear and analogues identified in a
manner that permits their application within the ordinary contexts found in the manifest image.
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Wilfred Sellars gave us a powerful insight into human understanding when he
distinguished the scientific from the manifest image in Science, Perception and Reality.
The distinction is roughly between the world as investigated and understood through the
constructed concepts and special tools of science and the world as understand by
naturally evolving concepts and ordinary sense perception. Both of these perspectives
have afforded considerable success in producing useful and presumably true knowledge.
And both have been the concern of philosophers since the inception of philosophical
thought.
Philosophy has vacillated between the two images with great names connected
with either and sometimes both. Plato’s views can fruitfully be seen as extrapolated from
the best science of his day, geometry, and Aristotle’s from biology, The relation of Kant
to Newtonian physics is well know and the emphasis on philosophy of science in the 20th
century testifies to the power of the scientific image. Yet the manifest image is
philosophically compelling for it, after all, is the expression of the phenomenology of
being and the basis for all practical success until the technological driven era that began
fitfully in classical times, moved forward in the 19th century and then exploded in the 20th
with undoubtedly the greatest increase in the quantity and quality of knowledge in the
history of humankind.
This distinction is analogous to a similar polarity within logic and especially in its
application to argumentation. On the one hand logical concepts have been drawn from
science, most particularly, but not exclusively, mathematics; on the other hand ordinary
reasoning as captured by inquiry in the manifest image has always been a counterpoint to
the formal or mathematical. This is especially true in the last 30 years with the advent of
informal logical and argumentation theory, which moved from the abstract
characterization of argument as formally construed to an obviously more adequate
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conception of argument as dialogical. With very few exceptions informal logicians and
argumentation theorist have eschewed formal models in favor of conceptual structures as
ordinarily deployed. To offer a mathematical model at this time, particularly one drawn
from the practice of the science seems regressive, especially since such a model harkens
back to the era of logical empiricism, a point of view no longer popular even in the
philosophy of science. To offer such a model to informal logicians as an account relevant
to argumentation seems no less the perverse, but offer such a model I have.
For the past several years and in a number of publications I have offered a
metamathematical model of emerging truth (MET) and embedded it in a variety of
contexts relevant to argumentation. MET moves away from the natural notion of truth as
correspondence, common in philosophical thought from Aristotle to Tarski.
Correspondence requires that object of claims be specified independent of the claims
themselves. Emerging truth sees truth as a function of such claims and the inquiry in
which they are housed. Correspondence is plausible if arithmetic is our paradigm for truth
generating inquiry, since the truths of arithmetic are known independent of the logic that
accounts for there status as true (in arithmetic, provable). It may also have some purchase
when we are dealing with brute facts of common experience. But when we move into the
vast areas for which inquiry is required, truth independent of inquiry is impossible to
ascertain, since it is the purpose of the inquiry to come know the very truths in question.
The mathematical model itself can be seen as an existence proof; by developing
an actual mathematical model of a philosophical concept one may, show that whatever
else its failings, the concept is not vacuous. Of course the existence of a mathematical
model does not show relevance to any particular area of concern. This is a major lesson to
be drawn from the failure of mathematical logic to capture much of what was to be seen
essential in argumentation by both informal logicians and argumentation theorists.
In what follows I briefly outline the context that supports the model and then
describe the models salient features. Then I will briefly sketch two applications of the
model. First to legal argument, which has some affinity with scientific argument in that it
is codified and hierarchical, and then to a more distant context, that of ethical argument.
In this way I hope to indicate the power of the approach.
THE MOTIVATION FOR THE MET
The original model was designed in response to the following conjecture: If you ask a
sane relatively well-informed person what the universe is made of, the answer is most
likely to be some hodgepodge of words about atoms, molecules and the like. That is to
say, the working ontology of the modern world is the ontology of medium level physical
chemistry. The question then was how is ontology internal to a point of view such as
physical chemistry warranted (Weinstein, 2002). But ontology is traditionally linked to
truth and so if one understood the basis for ontological commitment one might have a
clue as to how the notion of truth might be thought about (Weinstein, 2007). This is clear
both logically and historically. The ontology of natural kinds gave Aristotle his basic
understanding of the categorical proposition and through the development of a logical
structure could define a truth predicate in terms of something analogous to the modern
notion of satisfaction. In Plato the ontology of forms and the requirement of necessity as
a hallmark of philosophical truth moved Plato to the geometrization of ontology as in the
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Timeaus, a powerful metaphor that influenced Renaissance science particularly in
Copernicus and Galileo, and resonated with the subsequent philosophical and scientific
thought in Leibniz and Newton. In the 20th the link was made the basis for modern logic
and much of modern metaphysics through the work of the Wittgenstein in the Tractatus
and Russell’s logical atomism. The culmination may been seen in the Quineian aphorism,
to be is to be the value of a variable, that is, ontology is to be exhibited through the
medium of a truth predicate in an adequate logical language.
More pertinently for the context of the paper, the model addressed my intuition of
the centrality of Toulmin’s model to an adequate theory of argument, especially the
notion of warrant. In a recent paper (Weinstein, 2006) I addressed some of the
contentious issues surrounding Stephen Toulmin's influential jurisprudential model. The
model gives clear sense of the distinction between backing warrants and grounds and,
more important, shows why warrants cannot be collapsed into logical implications. Most
important, the model permits an intuitive analysis of warrant kinds, which are seen as
forming a hierarchy of logical strength. This affords a graded analysis of argumentative
support in terms of the strength of the warrants brought forward.. By having a flexible
notion of warrant the weight of argumentative support moves beyond reliance upon the
evidence to include the robustness of the principled generalizations through which
evidence is seen as relevant to the claim. This is essential, for example, to account for the
nuance of expert testimony and opens the door to a deeper appreciation of the epistemic
power of various disciplinary frames.
The model draws its epistemology from an overt Copernican turn. That is, rather
than looking to purportedly a priori criteria as the source of normativity, I look to
successful practice (Weinstein, 2006a). I choose, what seems to me, the most successful
epistemological practice in the history of human inquiry: physical chemistry as initiated
by the development of the periodic table and continuing with increasing practical and
theoretical advance through the 20th century, resulting in the most amazing increase of
knowledge at the highest level of reliability in human history. Physical chemistry with its
supporting array in physics and in its application to material science, both organic and
inorganic is, arguably, the foundation of our entire technological competence.
A BRIEF INFORMAL SKETCH OF THE MET
The model presupposes a number of things that are unusual in formal logic but quite
natural in actual argumentation (Weinstein, 2007a). The first is a relevance filter. It is
assumes that any manifestly irrelevant premises are discarded as their irrelevance is
ascertained. The second, that a discourse frame set the standards of rigor in
argumentation and that degrees of rigor appropriate to an argumentation context are
determined as the argumentation proceeds. This would be part of what the Amsterdam
theorists call the opening stage, or part of the backing in Toulmin’s sense. Third, it is
non-monotonic, that is to say inference is reconsidered as new premises are made
available. Finally, it is dynamic rather than static. An inference is evaluated within a
network of associated inferences and the history of the network. This is a basis for a deep
reconsideration of the nature of warrants. Warrants are of varying strength, basic
distinctions can be made in dimensions of strength, strong warrants are housed within a
body of generalizations (not necessarily universal), strong warrants connect such bodies
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of generalization into progressive networks and super strong warrants are strong warrants
of exceptional breadth and depth. Although such language is metaphoric, a precise
mathematical characterization has been offered in the papers indicated above. For the
purpose here the mathematics is necessary, for it shows that the concepts are not vacuous,
but not sufficient. For until such a view is shown to be relevant to actual argumentation,
rather than then merely satisfying the stylized image that metamathemics imposes on
logical discussions, the view is of little interest to informal logicians and argument
theorists. This requires that the intuition behind the mathematics be exposed and its
relevance to actual argument be demonstrated. One caution, after all is said and done the
mathematics, no matter how imposing, must reduce to a clear and noetically powerful
philosophical intuition. One should not be surprised if such an intuition is transparent and
obvious once noticed, for that is the power of deep logical advance.
The mathematics proper is characterized by two essential logical concepts, that of
modeling (various weak entailment relationship with classical implication as a limiting
case) and a deeper sense of entailment that relies on the connection between discrete sets
of principles and even vocabulary (what in the philosophy of science is called reduction).
Reductions are not unlike the analytic entailments of logical empiricism; my first
intuition was to equate such entailments with L-true in Beta in the sense of Carnap's
classic discussion in the Meaning and Necessity. I now see this connection in terms of a
hierarchy of warrant kinds, that may often appear to be ‘meaning postulates’ but although
more rigid then weaker warrants, such warrants are resistant to change and form the
foundation of inter-theoretic connection that fuel conceptual advance and deeper
understanding.
Although the second of the two functions has the most novelty the first one
permits a radical shift in perspective to be clearly seen: that is it is the dynamics, not the
statics of argument wherein the essential logical concepts lie. The function that maps a
theory onto a body of evidence, the basic insight behind philosophical accounts of
explanation since Aristotle and canonized by Hempel and his followers, is no more than
that condition that the for a significant claim to be about the world there has to be a
‘match up.’ Of course the devil is in the details, but the deep intuition that science is true
just when what it describes is the case has been at the center of modern logic and
rightfully so.
The problem, of course, is what is to be the case. One source of our strongest
intuitions is the clarity and naturalness with which our sense perceptions, memory etc.
conform to the world. If there is any candidate for the best epistemological practice
besides for physical chemistry, it has to be common sense perceptual based reasoning,
which we employ everyday and for the most part do rather well as measured by success
at both the species and individual levels. But of course we make grievous errors. It is the
path to correct these errors that the model attempts to indicate. The intuition drawn from
physical chemistry is clear, We expect our descriptions and measurements to increase in
reliable detail and to afford predictive success at an increasingly nuanced level, that is to
say, the models of our assertions must be increasingly adequate to the reality that they
attempt to describe. It is the dynamics of this advance that moves truth from truth in a
model to truth in a chain of models the members of which are increasing in adequacy to
the phenomena as we test and probe in standard ways. Those standard ways are
themselves difficult to ascertain, but determine them we do in practice in all of those
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domains in which we are increasingly successful with our inquiries. The notion has been
given precise mathematical characterization in the MET, what is relevant here is the
intuition. We are rarely right or wrong simpliciter (at least not in areas that requires
argument). Rather the picture emerges through argumentation and other methods of
inquiry.
Whatever the power of the intuition of correspondence between our models and
reality, physical chemistry teaches us a deeper lesson. It is not only more adequate
descriptions and predictions that we require. We require that they be robust, that is
reliable. Such robustness appears to be based not on any one chain models (sequences of
observations and explanations) but by the coordination of many such sequences (model
chains) through an overarching theory, and ultimately the unification of such theories in
grand overarching theories that reconceptualize the elements of descriptive models in
theoretic terms of deep explanatory power and enormous connectivity. The unification of
myriad chemical explanations in the Periodic Table was only the first in a century of
advances, as hitherto unrelated area of physical sickness were seen to follow analogous
principles that could then be reconceptualized in terms of a powerful micro-theory that
resulted in many more empirical determinations and a general increase in the adequacy of
the theory-driven models. Organic chemistry is one such grand unification, giving us a
rich understanding of the very architecture of life in chemical terms. The richly connected
theories and practices within physical chemistry is the basis for our understanding of
pretty much everything else in the physical universe, from the makeup of stars to the
making of microchips. Being right in our empirical models is neither necessary nor
sufficient. Incorrect models are frequently useful in practice (Cartwright, 1983). Our
models need to be progressive, and they need to be embedded in a hierarchy of
connections that give logical force to explanations by their depth and breadth, and such a
wealth of coordinated theories needs, itself, to be progressive. The mathematics shows
that these desiderata are not mere words or amorphous metaphors. The model gives
precise mathematical content to each of these, and permits a definition of truth as
emerging from inquiry.
TWO APPLICATIONS OF THE MET
Legal reasoning exists in the stylized context of lawyers’ briefs and court decisions. Each
of this restrict the argument in a variety of ways, but the most compelling restriction on
legal reasoning is a principle of coherence, stare decisis, a conservative principle that
valorizes precedent. Briefs are constructed based on the facts of the matter and the legal
precedents. But neither the facts nor the precedents are absolute, rather through the course
of trial procedures factual claims are brought into question and through judges’ decisions
and the appellate process the relevance of precedence is also open to question. The
appellate structure forms a clear hierarchy of logical power. As one moves up the
hierarchy judgments and the principles that they instantiate form a logically asymmetric
chain: lower court decisions may be overturned by higher course decisions and not vice
versa. Higher court decisions do, however, take into account the facts as brought forward
in trial as well as the interpretations of the lower court. And so even higher order
principles are defeasible in light of information from below. This asymmetric back and
forth down a chain, with higher order principles and decisions offering meaning down the
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chain and lower order descriptions and decisions giving content up the chain is captured
in the MET. That aside, the model tells us that the adequacy of such a structure is a
function of increasing articulation, depth and breadth over time. These are readily
interpretable in legal reasoning.
Based on the criteria of increasing articulation we would conjecture that a legal
argument is logically compelling when it enables more of the details to be seen. That is,
the laws cited in a brief illuminate more of the salient facts of the matter and show their
relevance. It is more than some amorphous appeal to total evidence, rather arguments are
evaluated by showing that through dialogical advance, the arguments brought forward
(the laws cited) offer a lens that permits more of the evidence to be admitted for
consideration as relevant to the determination under existing laws.
Depth is easily defined in terms of the hierarchy of court decision. A legal
argument is logically compelling when it reaches up through appellate decisions and so
withstands its overturn on appellate grounds. The appellate procedures redefines the
meaning of lower court cases, by seeing them to be in reinterpretable as (or in violation
of) a higher order principle. A legal argument is sound when it permits of interpretations
that show coherence with higher court rulings.
Breath is also an apparent property of legal reasoning. Although law is divided
into a number of discrete legal realms, torts, criminal law, family law etc., laws apply
through a range of cases within these large groupings. Logically powerful laws cover
their terrain and are usefully expanded to newly relevant areas. A powerful legal
argument, for example, that extended copyright protection to digital media, shows its
power by extending the basic legal concept from its original domain (print) to a new and
relevantly similar medium (the world wide web). But the most powerful principles, deep
procedural principles such as habeas corpus, unify realms of law by showing them to be
subject to profound intuitions about the rule of law and the search for justice.
MET gives a mathematical image of such a structure. Whether it will prove useful
in analyzing actual legal argumentation remains to be seen. But its precision should
permit computer models of legal argument to be constructed and their power across the
array of laws and precedents determined. Although this may appear fanciful, lawyers and
judges make such determinations as part their expert competence. An expert model based
on such reasoning should be no more difficult to construct than expert programs for
medical reasoning. Magnani (2001) offers a schematic of such expert systems that might
be usefully applied to legal reasoning. In his schematic he indicates movements from data
to explanations and vice versa. MET offers a possible structure for adding details to such
an abstract account. The construction of a computer model for legal (or medical)
reasoning based on MET would be the strongest evidence for its usefulness. But even in
the intuitive terms of the discussion so far, it seems clear that concern with increasing
articulation, depth and breadth afford an image of legal reasoning that gives coherence to
its complexity and moves us far from a simplistic ‘covering law’ image of how lawyers
and judges function. The relationship of a more adequate image of legal argument to
ascertaining the adequacy of legal reasoning, by parity with scientific inquiry, rests upon
an adequate account of what makes legal reasoning as a system of inquiry more effective,
an area in which much work needs to be done. Breadth and depth point to consistency in
the basis for judgment a possible surrogate for the appeal to equality before the law, a
presumptive criterion for adequacy. Degree of articulation appeals to relevant difference,
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another goal of legal systems, in the face of the over-extension of principles to unlike
cases.
Ethical reasoning consists of broadly relevant principles, some of them metaethical that have been exposed to human understanding through decades of practical,
religious and philosophical inquiry. Meta-ethical principles encapsulated in such
fundamental postures as consequentialism and deontology have been articulated by
philosophers and have been applied to myriads of human decisions along with their
correlative concern with human suffering and universalizability (lack of special
pleading). Countless equally robust ethical principles have been codified in religious and
legal systems since such systems have been available in written records, and undoubtedly
before then in ancient and well-established practices. Killing, theft, injury, family life and
the concerns of exchange have all been the subject of ethical scrutiny and the human race
in aggregate and within particular cultures has available no shortage of general
prohibitions and other sorts of mandates. The problem is their application, and especially
the coherent application of such principles in light of the complexity of human action and
our limited ability to foresee consequences and other sorts of ramifications. As we have
seen earlier legal systems are constructed to deal with such complexity by having
hierarchies of evaluation that reach down to cases, and slowly change as new cases
confront old precedents. Legal reasoning is constructed to utilize this interplay and has
codified. in terms of clear institutionalized procedures and priorities, methods for
determining the array of principles to be applied in a case, looking towards a defeasible
determination.
In ethics we have access to cases and broad principles, this is itself explains the
two poles of ethical discussion, casuistry on the one hand, philosophical ethics on the
other. But given the abstraction of principles and the specificity of cases what are clearly
needed are medium level generalizations that both reflect principles and that permit the
salient details of cases to become apparent. The model gives us a clue as to how to
advance. Naturally, the MET gives little help in inventing such mediating principles but it
does point to criteria for adequacy.
The first is that mediating principles should sort cases into bundles based on
modest generalizations, consistent with higher order principles, and yet be illustrative of
salient aspects of the cases. The issues is, of course, salience, we can not look at such
medium level principles at a point, but rather have to see how they fair when confronted
with the dimensions of ethical decision making. All things being equal they should form a
chain of increasingly general principles, while being rooted in the cases. In the law such
concepts are built into levels of seriousness in the violation of general legal prohibitions.
For example, the sequence first, second, third degree murder, manslaughter and
justifiable homicide as a function of the heinous nature of the crime and criminal intent
differentiates, in a clear ordering, violations of the principle against taking a human life.
Such an ordering permits relevantly similar cases to be grouped and appropriate middle
level principles to apply. Substantive moral principles should do no less.
Such sorting of moral cases requires that moral principles, like legal principles,
should identify the aspects of a case that are salient for moral judgment. That is to say a
logically powerful moral principle lets us see what in a case matters in light of our need
to make a moral judgment that is universal across a class of relevantly similar cases.
Long-standing disputes such as the abortion debate require, at least, that a substantive
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moral principle determining what is human life and when it begins be available. Although
there is no agreement as to what that is, the MET shows us why if it needed. That is the
second contribution of the MET, a focus on breadth and depth. This enables is to
illuminate the texture of the warranting argumentation. In the abortion debate, each
position relies on different higher-order principles whether scientific, religious or
sociological. Such principles exist within a network of moral concerns. Each network
striving for internal coherence through inferential relations between the principles it
includes, and attempts to illustrate its adequacy by the role of such principles in clear
cases and its consistency with higher-order relevant principles (in the abortion debate the
rights of a woman to personal physical integrity in one network, human life at the point of
conception in another). In terms of the MET each principle appeals to the depth of the
moral reach and the concomitant breadth of its application. The right to physical integrity
is a powerful argument because is unifies so many ethical judgments ranging from
prohibitions against assault to unequal access to medical clear, and similarly for the
absolute definition of life at conception. The recalcitrance of the debate can now readily
be seen once we realize that each of these networks of values form a unique and
heretofore incommensurable backing for the argument. It is only by a grand unification of
e.g. religious and humanistic value networks that a definitive resolution is to be hoped
for. Failing that unification we can only look for the history of effectiveness of each of
the moral constellations and opt in light of their progressive nature which one it is
rational to adhere to given their comparative histories at a point. Whether a natural notion
of effectiveness, parallel to the obvious effectiveness of physical science can be
elaborated once an adequate model of progress can be applied to ethics rests, as on an
account of the goals of moral reasoning. As with legal reasoning, consistency of the
underlying principles and sensitivity to the particulars have some prima facie force as
indicators of adequacy. What may seem astounding is that such intuitions are given
precise mathematical content in the MET. What is clear is that the considerations
presented here are obvious from the point of view of the MET, and perhaps not as
obvious from other logical reconstructions of moral argument.
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